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Abstract 
This paper assesses if the experience of an acute illness generates decreased job mobility among 
workers with employer-sponsored health insurance. An acute illness may increase the perceived 
value of health insurance and “lock” workers into jobs that provide health insurance as 
compensation. Using difference-in-difference tests, I evaluate the presence of job lock among 
workers impacted by acute health problems in Panel 19 of the Medical Expenditure Panel 
Survey. The results provide inconclusive evidence of job lock related to the experience of an 
acute illness. Further research on acute illness-related job lock can explore the potential long-
term impact of job lock and different measures for acute illness to limit the effects of 
endogeneity in empirical models. 
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Introduction 
In the United States, many workers receive health insurance as a part of their 
compensation. Health insurance through an employer is income-tax-free because the costs are 
paid with pre-tax dollars. Furthermore, coverage is usually less expensive as a group policy 
through an employer (Tunceli, Short, Moran, and Tunceli 2009). However, the use of health 
insurance as a fringe benefit is problematic because policies are specific to the employer and 
position held. The transfer of health coverage between employers is not guaranteed.  
The connection between employment and access to health insurance reduces job mobility 
in what is known as “job lock.” Workers remain in positions that ensure health insurance. Some 
workers will continue in positions poorly matched for their skill sets to retain health insurance 
creating employer-employee mismatch. These job-locked employees do not maximize their own 
skills and prevent qualified individuals from moving into more fitting positions. 
Many studies have reviewed the relationship between job lock and health status. Persons 
with greater healthcare needs value insurance more. They are consequently less mobile in the 
workforce when their employer is their source of coverage. While the relationship between 
chronic illness and job lock is known, there is limited literature on the effect of acute illness. A 
chronic health issue generates high future healthcare costs in the long run locking a worker to 
employment supplying health insurance. Acute health problems are temporary and should not 
generate serious future financial burdens. However, the experience of short-term severe illness or 
injury may enhance risk aversion and increase the perceived value of coverage. In this study, I 
will explore the influence of serious acute illness on the mobility of persons reliant on employer-
sponsored health insurance (ESHI). I expect to find the experience of a significant acute health 
issue will generate job lock for workers receiving employer-sponsored insurance.   
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My paper will expand current economic literature on the relationship between job lock 
and health status. The specific impact of acute ill health on job lock is largely unexplored, yet 
many people will experience acute ill health at some point in their careers. This work will 
contribute to a more thorough understanding of the causes of job lock. Recognizing if acute 
health problems do reduce mobility for US workers with employer-sponsored health coverage 
will provide direction for efforts to eliminate job lock.  
Political and business leaders can design public policy and insurance practices more 
effective at allowing full labor mobility and proper employer-employee matching. This ability to 
reduce job lock could in turn enhance overall economic efficiency. Overqualified workers are 
compensated at lower levels than the value they provide (Duncan and Hoffman 1981). The 
elimination of mismatch caused by job lock will properly allocate resources and skills for greater 
productivity.  
Furthermore, a greater understanding of the causes of job lock is particularly valuable due 
to the popularity of employer-sponsored health insurance in the United States. The 2016 Current 
Population Survey analyzed by Barnett and Berchick (2017) found 55.7% of individuals receive 
health coverage as a fringe benefit of their or their family member’s employment. Previous 
Current Population Surveys demonstrate that rates of employer-sponsored health insurance have 
remained steady since 2013. Accordingly, a large portion of US workers are at risk of being “job 
locked” and contributing to inefficiency.  
Literature Review 
Since the 1990s, economists have applied behavioral economic principles to the study of 
labor markets. Becker’s (1993) behavioral model suggested consumers can make choices in 
pursuit of characteristics like loyalty and altruism as much as for personal interest. The 
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application of Becker’s perspective can explain inefficiencies in microeconomic labor supply 
and compensation decisions (Dohmen 2014). A major inefficiency in the labor market, labor 
mismatch, has been more recently understood through behavioral economic assumptions.  
Mismatched workers are employed in positions that do not complement their skill set. 
Morgado et al. (2015) described the different types of mismatch as overeducation and 
undereducation. Overeducation mismatch occurs when workers possess a higher level of 
education than necessary for their positions (Ordine and Rose 2011). Duncan and Hoffman 
(1981) originally attributed employer-employee mismatch to faster growth in educational 
attainment than in skills requirements. Classical models assume a firm’s production processes 
are flexible to adapt to increases in worker ability which contradicts the long-term prevalence of 
mismatch (Kleibrink 2016).  Ordine and Rose (2011) applied a behavioral perspective to 
accurately explain observations of mismatch. They suggested employer-employee mismatch is a 
result of individual worker choice based on the variety of worker’s compensation preferences.  
Regardless of cause, the improper matching of workers to firms has significant 
consequences on economic efficiency due to inadequate compensation practices (see Bender and 
Heywood 2009, Leuven and Oosterbeek 2011, Kleibrink 2016). Duncan and Hoffman (1981) 
found disproportionate payoffs for education in mismatched workers. Years of required 
education produced statistically higher earnings for a position. However, surplus years of 
education increased earnings at lower rate than the required educational attainment. Bender and 
Heywood (2009) found similar results in a study of PhD-level scientists. Scientists whose 
education only partially matched their employment saw earning 6.9% lower than scientists in 
well matched positions. Completely unmatched scientists faced earnings 13.9% lower than well-
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matched workers. Additionally, scientists had higher probabilities of turnover and lower rates of 
job satisfaction if their jobs did not relate to their education.  
Kleibrink’s (2016) analysis of the German labor market found mixed results on mismatch 
inefficiency. Too much or too little education had no effect on earnings, but the proper amount of 
education for a job statistically increased payoff. The exact scale of mismatch and the 
consequent economic inefficiency is unknown but Morgado et al. (2015) suggested that 
employer-employee mismatch is large. Across European countries, between 15 and 35% of 
workers hold positions that they are over or under qualified for.  
While inefficient mismatch can increase the tendency of some workers to move between 
jobs (see Bender and Heywood 2009 and Pellizzari 2011), long-term mismatch can also be the 
outcome of limited mobility. “Job lock” is the condition of decreased mobility due to a reliance 
on employer-sponsored health insurance. In classical perfectly competitive markets, the value of 
health coverage is calculated for the worker at the margin of entry into the labor force. However, 
many workers value health insurance more than the worker at the margin creating friction in 
mobility. Because health insurance is not portable between jobs, workers themselves enforce 
mismatch by “locking” themselves in poorly matched jobs to retain access to health coverage 
(Chatterji, Brandon and Markowitz 2016).  
Various studies have considered how employer-provided health insurance and other 
forms of compensation impact mobility. Mitchell (1982) and Allen, Clark and McDermed (1993) 
analyzed the non-portability of pensions as a cause of inflexibility in the labor market. Using 
probit regression analysis, Mitchell found that employer-provided pensions significantly lowered 
rates of job change for men and women. However, medical and life insurance as compensation 
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had an insignificant impact on labor turnover, although Mitchell attributed the insignificance to 
correlation between fringe benefits.  
Research beginning in the 1990s specifically analyzed the presence of job lock related to 
ESHI using two primary techniques. One category of job lock literature measures changes in 
mobility among workers with ESHI due to public policy changes. If workers with ESHI are job-
locked, new legislation that expands access to other sources of health insurance should increase 
their mobility rates more relative to individuals with other sources of insurance. The second 
category of literatures tests differences in mobility among workers who value coverage 
differently due to personal characteristics.  Workers with ESHI who place a high value on health 
insurance should experience lower rates of job change than individuals without ESHI or who 
value health insurance less.  
Empirical studies find mixed evidence of job lock using the two difference-in-difference 
techniques. Brigitte Madrian (1994) found initial proof of job lock by calculating differences in 
turnover rates for workers with comparatively high or low costs to losing health insurance. 
Assuming that the higher the cost of losing healthcare, the greater the impact of job lock, 
Madrian identified three unique measures of the cost of losing healthcare. She tested turnover 
rates between households with different access to alternative forms of health coverage, varied 
family sizes, and different immediate needs for care due to a pregnant family member. Madrian 
(1994) found significantly lower job mobility among workers relying on their employment for 
coverage. While controlling for household demographics such as income, education, and race, 
workers with employer coverage experienced a greater difference in mobility between workers 
with high and low costs of health insurance loss, consistent with the theory of job lock.  
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One criticism of Madrian’s test for job lock using differences in health status and 
coverage availability is a failure to control for endogeneity (Hamersma and Kim 2009). Isolating 
job lock is difficult because factors affecting a worker’s value for health insurance are generally 
related to other factors affecting job mobility. For example, workers with large families consume 
more healthcare which increases the value of the worker’s health insurance. However, workers 
with large families may be more likely work in jobs with high salaries that offer flexible 
schedules making them less mobile. 
Ideally, researchers can avoid endogeneity in measuring job lock if they can determine 
exogenous characteristics that increase the value of ESHI. They can show the extent of job lock 
through differences in mobility rates between groups with and without the exogenously 
determined characteristic. However, because exogenous characteristics are difficult to determine, 
studies can use difference-in-difference measurements to look for job lock within a sample. The 
difference-in-difference test measures if there is additional mobility loss generated from having 
both a high value for health coverage and ESHI. If job lock exists, there should be greater 
mobility loss due to a higher value for insurance for workers with ESHI than workers without 
ESHI. Finally, the endogeneity between ESHI and other job characteristics can be avoided by 
studying mobility among workers that did or did not receive offers of health coverage instead of 
workers that received or did not receive coverage. Workers who decline an offer of ESHI likely 
share other job characteristics with workers who accept offers of ESHI.  
Several studies I discuss below apply Madrian’s 1994 theory connecting worker or family 
health status and coverage to job lock and the authors use a variety of techniques to control for 
endogeneity. Buchmueller and Valletta (1996) extend Madrian’s work by controlling for the 
impact of pension availability and job tenure on labor mobility. While Madrian tests for job lock 
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through the interaction between married men’s coverage and their spouses’ coverage, 
Buchmueller and Valleta suggest this effect creates a biased measurement of job lock for two 
reasons. Married men that can receive insurance from a spouse likely do not share many other 
characteristics with married men without insurance from a spouse. Furthermore, the likelihood of 
job change by a married worker is influenced by the job opportunities of a spouse.  
Buchmueller and Valleta control for these sources of bias using two-stage probit 
regression for the interaction variable between worker and spousal coverage. They find women 
in dual earner families are significantly less mobile by approximately 34-38%. Men in dual 
earner families experience an insignificant reduction in mobility of 25-31%. When controlling 
for the probability of a spouse’s job change, the loss of mobility among women increases but 
also becomes less significant at only a 12% level. Furthermore, the authors find insignificant 
rates of job lock among single men and men in single earner families but find ESHI significantly 
lowers the mobility of single women by as much as 35-40%.  
Many studies find an individual’s health status affects the likelihood of job lock. Stroupe, 
Kinney, and Kneisner (2001) specifically explore the role of chronic poor health in an individual 
or family member in creating labor force friction for employer-covered workers. Workers with 
chronically poor health or who are responsible for the care of a chronically ill family member 
face high present healthcare costs and expect to face high future costs. They are also less likely 
to find equivalent policies in a job switch and as such are at greater risk for job lock. Stroupe et 
al. estimate Cox proportional hazard models for leaving the labor market for individuals affected 
by chronic illness. Comparisons between those with ESHI and other sources of insurance show 
decreased mobility for individuals relying on employment for health coverage. Additionally, 
Stroupe, Kinney, and Kneisner’s research reveals key similarities and differences in the 
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experience of job lock between men and women.  Both chronically ill men and women with 
ESHI are approximately 40% less mobile than similar men or women with other sources of 
insurance. Men reliant on their employers for coverage experience a comparatively lower 
propensity to leave current employment due to the personal experience of a chronic illness. Job-
locked women have relatively lower propensities to leave employment due to a family member’s 
illness, rather than a personal health problem.  
Tunceli, Short, Moran, and Tunceli (2009) consider the mobility of cancer survivors with 
employer-provided coverage. Due to pre-existing condition restrictions, cancer survivors are less 
likely to find comparable insurance policies after leaving a job. Furthermore, the authors note 
employer-sponsored coverage is generally less costly than individual insurance and is income-
tax-free because ESHI is paid for with pre-tax dollars. They find statistically significant evidence 
of job lock for both male and female cancer survivors. Male cancer survivors with ESHI are 29.2 
percentage points less likely to exit the workforce, while similar women have a lower probability 
of exiting by17.2 percentage points. Survivors also show lower rates of transition between jobs 
compared to non-cancer survivors (33.4 percentage points lower for men and 26.4 percentage 
points lower for women). However, Tunceli, Short, Moran, and Tunceli acknowledge potential 
bias in their difference-in-difference measurements due to the endogeneity of cancer 
survivorship. 
Bradley, Neumark, and Motika (2012) find workers respond differently to specific types 
of health issues when relying on an employer for health insurance. They analyze the mobility of 
men who experienced various negative health shocks as the subgroup less likely to have 
alternative spousal coverage. However, poor health impacts employment status directly and 
indirectly through a reliance on ESHI. Furthermore, the presence of multiple chronic diseases in 
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a worker, also known as comorbidities, creates measurement error. As a control in their 
difference-in-difference measurements, Bradley, Neumark, and Motika differentiate between 
health problems with and without immediate comorbidities. They find significant job lock 
among men who experience a decline in health status without comorbidities while covered 
through their employers. Compared to healthy older men, men in poor health with ESHI are 
statistically more likely to remain at their jobs by nearly 30 percentage points.  
In a similar study, Bradley, Neumark, and Barkowski (2013) find proof of job lock 
among married women with recent breast cancer diagnoses. Many workers facing serious health 
problems prefer to take time off for recovery. However, their immediate demand for healthcare 
increases meaning many must remain in the work force, often at full-time. Bradley, Neumark, 
and Barkowski survey female breast cancer patients at 2 months and 9 months after diagnosis 
They supplement the survey data with records of healthy individuals from the Current Population 
Survey to compare mobility rates between subgroups. The authors control for endogeneity by 
conditioning upon labor supply status prior to diagnosis. They find labor supply reductions 
among women with recent breast cancer diagnoses are approximately 8-11% smaller than labor 
supply reductions of women with other sources of insurance.  
Using public policy changes as “natural experiments” to test for job lock also avoids 
endogeneity issues if the policy change has no direct effect on income or employment (Boyle 
and Lahey 2010). Evidence of job lock in policy studies is mixed.  
Bansak and Raphael (2008) find evidence of reduced job lock in the introduction of the 
State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) which allowed families with incomes over 
Medicaid eligibility to purchase inexpensive insurance for their children. They compare rates of 
job change before and after the policy implementation for men with SCHIP-eligible children. 
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Fathers without access to insurance through a spouse experience job change 9 percentage points 
more often after the policy implementation compared to fathers with a spouse’s insurance. 
Falsification testing with a higher income control group confirms the relative greater increase in 
mobility for married men without access to a spouse’s health coverage. Boyle and Lahey (2010) 
use a similar technique to study job lock in veterans after the elimination of eligibility 
requirements for health coverage. With expanded coverage, veterans are more likely to cease 
working, more likely to switch to part-time work, and more likely to become self-employed if 
highly educated relative to non-veterans. 
Hamersma and Kim (2009) examine reductions in job lock from the Medicaid expansion 
under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities Reconciliation Act of 1996. They 
hypothesize that the Medicaid expansion changes the reservation threshold, the value at which a 
worker leaves his or her current job, of job-locked workers. However, the decrease in Medicaid 
eligibility requirements did not affect turnover rates for men and married women. Unmarried 
women experience only a 4 to 5% increase in job change per $100 change in the eligibility 
threshold. Hamersma and Kim attribute the small decrease in job lock to their sampling methods 
which focused on low income households.  
Fairlie et al. (2016) explore the natural discontinuity of Medicare eligibility for adults at 
the age of 65 as a means of relieving job lock. As the availability of non-employer-funded 
insurance increases with access to government-provided Medicare, job mobility among workers 
over age 65 is expected to increase if job lock existed. However, the data, controlling for 
confounding demographic and work characteristics, reveals no significant difference in worker 
mobility between the pre-and post-Medicare eligibility period. Fairlie et al.’s findings suggest 
job lock may not be a major labor force issue for older workers.  
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Finally, Chatterji, Brandon, and Markowitz (2016) and Bailey and Chorniy (2016) find 
mixed evidence of job lock in analyzing the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). 
The ACA prevents child exclusions from coverage due to pre-existing conditions. Chatterji, 
Brandon, and Markowitz find significant reductions in job lock for married men with chronically 
ill children.  Additionally, the ACA’s dependent coverage mandate increases the availability of 
coverage for individuals aged 19-25 by allowing individuals below age 26 to remain on their 
parent’s insurance. Bailey and Chorniy test for job lock among younger workers by measuring 
the change in the job mobility of adults ages 19 to 25 after the ACA passage compared to 
mobility changes in slightly younger and older adults. Bailey and Chorniy (2016) find no 
significant change in the job mobility rates of the 19 to 25-year-old cohort compared to other age 
groups suggesting job lock is not a major labor force issue for young adults.  
Theory and Empirical Models 
In this study, I extend previous research by Madrian (1994) and Stroupe, Kinney, and 
Kneisner (2001) that tests for job lock generated by a worker’s health status1. I explore if the 
experience of an acute illness decreases rates of job change for workers with ESHI by increasing 
the perceived value of health insurance. To assess the effect of acute illness, I define the 
experience of an acute illness as a trip to the emergency room due to an accident or injury. A 
measure of acute illness as emergency room visits may be endogenous as the likelihood of going 
to the emergency room may be correlated with qualities of a worker’s environment that directly 
influence job change. Therefore, difference-in-difference testing is the strongest means of testing 
for acute illness-related job lock with my data. The difference-in-difference test will provide an 
                                                          
1 Previous research has not assessed the direct impact of ESHI on job mobility to avoid the possibility of omitted 
variable bias in most data sets. ESHI is likely correlated with many other characteristics that affect mobility in the 
labor force.  
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accurate measure of job lock assuming the effect of an acute illness on job mobility is the same 
for workers with ESHI and workers without ESHI.  
Madrian (1994) developed difference-in-difference testing in linear probability models to 
isolate lower mobility in workers with employer-provided health insurance. The difference-in-
difference test assumes that the difference in the likelihood of a job change for workers who 
highly value health insurance and workers who do not will be greater for workers with employer-
sponsored health insurance than workers without insurance or covered through other means. To 
study if acute illness impacts worker mobility through ESHI, the difference-in-difference test for 
job lock where µ is the probability of a job change is seen below 2.   
 
 (µd - µb) – (µc -  µa) > 0 
I apply Madrian’s method of probit regression modeling to test if the experience of an 
acute health problem impacts the likelihood of job change by generating job lock. I separately 
model the impact of a personal acute health problem and an acute health problem of a family 
member on worker mobility. I model personal illness and illness in the family as individual 
regression because Stroupe, Kinney, and Kneisner (2001) find the source of a chronic illness 
                                                          
2 Madrian also provides a simple test of job lock: µd - µb > 0. Individuals covered by employer-sponsored health 
insurance without an acute health issue should be more mobile than employer-covered workers with an acute health 
problem. However, this test for job lock is typically considered weaker due to potential endogeneity, although it may 
be reasonable to assume certain measures of acute illness can be treated as exogenous variables.  
 
Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance 
 
No Yes 
Acute Illness µa µb 
No Acute Illness µc µd 
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affects the extent of job lock between men and women.  
Regression Model 1 tests for acute injury-related job lock as follows.  
(a) Probability of Job Change = β0 + β1 * Employer Coveragei + β2 * Personal Acute 
Injuryi + β3 *Employer Coveragei*Personal Acute Injuryi + β4 * Xi + β5 * Zi  
(b) Probability of Job Change = β0 + β1 * Employer Coveragei + β2 * Family Member 
Acute Injuryi + β3 *Employer Coveragei*Family Member Acute Injuryi + β4 * Xi + β5 
* Zi  
The difference-in-difference test for job lock is found in the sign and significance of β3 
which measures the additional change in likelihood of job change generated by ESHI and an 
acute injury.  
Xi is a vector of the following demographic characteristics that impact a worker’s value 
for health insurance or likelihood of job change. I control for family size because larger families 
may value health insurance more as they consume more healthcare services (Madrian 1994). Job 
mobility may be impacted by the geographic labor market although the difference in job 
opportunities between each region of the United States is uncertain (Boyle and Lahey 2010).  I 
also control for gender because previous studies have found estimates of job lock can differ 
between men and women (Buchmueller and Valletta 1996 and Stroupe, Kinney, and Kneisner 
2001). Generally, workers with higher levels of education will be more mobile because they have 
valuable transferable skills. However, at very high levels of education, mobility might be limited 
due to an overspecialization of skills. Most previous studies on job lock control for education 
level although empirical significance varies (Buchmueller and Valletta 1996, Stroupe, Kinney, 
and Kneisner 2001, Madrian 1994, and Boyle and Lahey 2010). I control for race because 
Buchmueller and Valletta (1996) and Boyle and Lahey (2010) find members of racial minorities 
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to be less mobile. Finally, I expect a person’s general health to impact likelihood of job change. 
Generally healthier workers will place less value on their health insurance which could increase 
their likelihood of changing employers. However, less healthy people may be more willing to 
cease working entirely because of their poor health. I also consider the effect of general health on 
mobility to isolate the impact of an acute illness on job lock because acute illnesses may be 
correlated with other health problems. 
Zi is a vector for the following job characteristics. I control for income as higher earnings 
in a current position increase the cost of a job change (Hamersma and Kim 2009 and Stroupe, 
Kinney, and Kneisner 2001). Receiving a pension as a non-transferable benefit in a current 
position lowers a worker’s likelihood of job change (Hamersma and Kim 2009). Membership in 
a union lowers worker mobility by increasing the benefits available through certain employers 
(Buchmueller and Valletta 1996). Finally, I control for occupation type because workers in 
white-collar jobs tend to be more mobile than blue collar workers due to their transferable skills 
(Stroupe, Kinney, and Kneisner 2001). 
Furthermore, I test a second regression model for acute injury-related job lock with an 
additional control for a worker’s behavior in the labor market. I expect a worker’s recent 
behavior in the labor force will affect future labor mobility decisions although the direction of 
this effect is uncertain. Recent job change may indicate an underlying propensity to change jobs 
(i.e. that someone is a mover) which may positively impact a worker’s chance of job change. 
However, if a worker recently moved into a new position that better fits the worker’s needs and 
skills, the cost of changing jobs has increased and the likelihood of job change should decrease. 
As in my first model, I will test the impact of a personal acute injury and an acute injury in the 
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family on job lock separately. Regression Model 2 tests for acute injury-related job lock as 
follows: 
(c) Probability of Job Change = β0 + β1 * Employer Coveragei + β2 * Personal Acute 
Health Problemi + β3 *Employer Coveragei*Personal Acute Health Problemi + β4 * 
Recent Job Changei + β5 * Xi +  β6 * Zi 
(d) Probability of Job Change = β0 + β1 * Employer Coveragei + β2 * Family Member 
Acute Health Problemi + β3 *Employer Coveragei*Family Member Acute Health 
Problemi + β4 * Recent Job Changei + β5 * Xi +  β6 * Zi 
Data  
I will study the impact of acute illness on job lock using data from Panel 19 of the 
Household Component of the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS). The U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services conducts this annual two-year panel survey to track change in the 
health statuses, health expenses, insurance coverage, and employment of individuals. The 
families and individuals surveyed are representative of the United States civilian non-
institutionalized population and participated in the 2014 National Health Interview Survey. A 
new panel begins each year such that two panels of households are active during each year. 
Information for households in Panel 19 is collected through five rounds of interviews from 
January 1, 2014 to December 31, 2015. An individual respondent for each household participates 
in five rounds of interviews over a span of two years and provides information on all household 
members. Each household constitutes a unique Dwelling Unit of persons residing at a single 
address. Each Dwelling Unit consists of one or more families3.  
                                                          
3 A family is defined as a group of people connected by blood, marriage, adoption, or foster care or who self-identify 
as a family. 
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Descriptive statistics for the variables I include in my analysis are shown in Table 1. Data 
for the observations are measured by interview round. In Model 1, I test for job lock using 
observations of job change between any two interview rounds. In Model 2, to condition upon 
previous job change during the survey, I restrict my analysis to job change decisions made 
between Rounds 4 and 5. Job change takes on a value of 1 if an individual voluntarily left his or 
her current main job between two interviews. If an individual remained in the same current main 
job between rounds or involuntarily left his or her position, job change is recorded as 0. To 
experience a job change or no job change between two rounds, a worker must report a current 
main job during the first of the two rounds.  
Acute illness is measured as a binary variable such that a value of 1 means the individual 
or family member experienced an acute health problem in the round directly before the round 
measuring a job change. For example, a worker either reports or does not report an acute health 
problem in Round 1 if the test for job change is between Round 1 and Round 2. In Model 2, 
acute illness takes a value of 1 if a worker or worker’s family member experienced an acute 
injury anytime in Rounds 1 through 4. As stated previously, I define an acute illness as an 
emergency room visit for the treatment of an injury or an accident constitutes an acute health 
problem. Because an acute illness refers to any health problem that occurs suddenly for a discrete 
time, injuries or accidents requiring emergency care meet these criteria. However, some acute 
illnesses are not captured in a measure of emergency room visits, for example, if individuals 
chose to forgo medical care or seek care outside of an emergency room for serious incidents. I 
address the potential errors from this measurement of acute illness in the discussion section.  
Finally, ESHI takes on a value of 1 if the worker received health insurance from his or 
her employer in the round preceding the potential job change.  
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As previously mentioned, I will include additional variables for job characteristics and 
personal demographics to control for natural variation in mobility rates. All control variables 
apart from education level and recent job change are measured at the interview round preceding 
a job change. Recent job change is included as a binary variable such that 1 means the worker 
changed jobs between any two previous survey rounds. Workers for which recent job change is 
measured have reported their job change decisions throughout Rounds 1, 2, and 3 meaning they 
are present in the survey across all rounds. Family size is measured as the total number of people 
identifying as a member of the worker’s family unit. Age measures the age of the worker in 
years. Race is measured in the following series of binary variables: Hispanic, White, Black, 
Asian, and Multiple Races. I omit White as the reference category to calculate the specific 
effects of racial minority status on labor mobility. Geographic region of the United States is 
measured as a set of dummy variables, Northeast, Midwest, West, and South, in the round before 
a potential job change. I omit Northeast as the reference category. Male is a dummy variable for 
gender such that a value of 1 indicates a male worker. The general health of the individual is also 
represented in a set of dummy variables. Survey respondents measured each household 
member’s perceived health as excellent, very good, good, fair, or poor. General health is a self-
reported measure and responses are heavily skewed towards better health which could suggest a 
trend toward inflating one’s health status. However, individuals with significant health problems 
may be less willing to participate in two-year intensive survey if randomly selected precisely 
because of their poor health. As such, better perceived health among participants may be an 
accurate representation of general wellbeing. I will omit excellent general health as the reference 
category. Finally, education is measured as a person’s highest level of education attained at their 
entrance into the survey. The possible categories are less than a high school degree, a high school 
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degree or equivalent, a bachelor’s degree, and a graduate degree and I omit bachelor’s degree as 
the reference category. 
An individual’s wage level in the round preceding a possible job change is included in 
dollars as an hourly wage.4 Union membership is accounted for as a binary variable such that 1 
means the individual is a member of a union. White-Collar is a dummy variable with a value of 1 
signaling the individual holds a white-collar job5. Finally, Pension is dummy variable such that a 
value of 1 means the individual receives a pension as a fringe benefit of employment in the 
round prior to a job change.  
Descriptive statistics for the data are found in Table 1. All tables are found in the 
Appendix. Almost half of respondents receive health insurance through their employers which is 
nearly representative of ESHI in the U.S. population (Barnett and Berchick 2017). Measures of 
personal acute injury and family member acute injury among survey respondents are low at 
approximately 3% and 6% of participants respectively.  
Results 
I first run simple difference-in-means T-tests on the samples for Model 1 and Model 2 
individually to test the impact of acute injury and ESHI on job mobility without controlling for 
demographic and job characteristics. Sample 1 considers individuals’ decisions to change jobs 
between any two consecutive rounds in the survey and is used in Model 1. Sample 2 considers 
job change decisions occurring between Round 4 and Round 5 and these observations are tested 
in Model 2. Table 2 presents the T-test results.  
                                                          
4 The maximum hourly wage is $78 in 2014 and $80 in 2015. The MEPS does not report the specific value of an 
hourly wage over $78 or $80 for confidentiality purposes. 
5 White-collar jobs are defined as those in management, business, financial operations, professional or related 
occupations, service, sales, and office-related occupations. Positions in farming, fishing, forestry, construction, 
extraction, maintenance, production, transportation, military, and unclassifiable occupations are non-white-collar 
jobs. 
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As expected, individuals without ESHI are significantly more mobile than individuals 
with ESHI for both samples. Individuals who have experienced a personal acute injury are more 
mobile than individuals who have not experienced acute injury without controlling for other 
factors. In both samples, there is no significant difference in mobility between persons who 
experience an acute injury in the family and individuals with no acute injury in the family. The 
interaction variable for ESHI and family member acute injury shows significantly less job 
change among individuals who experience an acute injury in the family and hold ESHI. This 
difference is significant in both Sample 1 and Sample 2, but we should consider that the 
interaction variable T-test which does not control for other factors could be picking up the strong 
impact of ESHI on job mobility. Finally, the interaction variable for ESHI and individual acute 
injury shows no significant difference in mobility for individuals holding ESHI who experience 
an acute injury relative to other groups in both samples.  
Table 3 presents the results of the probit regression analysis for Model 1 which estimates 
the impact of acute injury and ESHI on job mobility between two consecutive rounds. I first 
consider the impact of the control variables on job mobility without the test for job lock to 
confirm the expected effects of the control variables (Table 3 Column A). As anticipated, family 
size has a significant negative impact on the likelihood of job change. Older, higher-income, 
male workers with pensions are significantly less likely to change jobs. Living in the Midwest or 
South increases one’s likelihood of changing jobs compared to living in the Northeast. Asian and 
Hispanic individuals are significantly less likely to change jobs than White individuals.  There is 
no significant difference in mobility between workers in excellent health and very good health. 
Being in good health decreases a worker’s likelihood of job change compared to having excellent 
health. Workers in fair or poor health are significantly more likely to change jobs than those in 
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excellent health. Union membership significantly decreases likelihood of job change. Persons 
with graduate level education were significantly more likely to change jobs than persons with 
bachelor’s degrees. However, no significant difference in mobility is found between individuals 
with a high school degree or less and bachelor’s degree holders.  
I next test the full specifications of Model 1 for the effects of personal and family 
member acute injury on job lock. The regression results can be found in Table 3 Columns B and 
C for personal acute injury and family member acute injury respectively. Family size, worker 
age, income, union membership, and pensions significantly decrease the likelihood of job change 
as expected. There are no major differences in the effects of control variables in the full 
specifications of Model 1 apart from gender and type of occupation. Neither gender nor holding 
a white-collar job significantly affects likelihood of job change when including variables for 
ESHI and acute injury. ESHI significantly decreases the likelihood of job change and personal 
acute injury significantly increases the chance of job change at the 1% level. An acute injury in 
the family does not significantly affect job mobility. There is no evidence of job lock in the 
survey round directly following the experience of a personal acute injury or family member acute 
injury. The interaction between ESHI and personal acute injury has a positive insignificant 
coefficient as does the interaction between ESHI and family acute injury.  
Table 4 shows the probit coefficients for Model 2 estimating acute injury-related job lock 
with an additional control for job changes between previous survey rounds. I once again first 
consider the effects of the control variables on job mobility without the test for job lock to 
confirm the expected effects (Table 4 Column A). Recent job change in the previous survey 
rounds has a significant positive impact on likelihood of job change between Rounds 4 and 5. 
Higher income workers, men, older workers, and workers with pensions or union memberships 
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are significantly less likely to change jobs as expected. Race and self-reported health status do 
not significantly impact job mobility. Of the controls for region of the U.S., only South has a 
significant coefficient. Graduate degree holders are more likely to change jobs than bachelor’s 
degree holders, but there is no significant difference in mobility between bachelor’s degree 
holders and those with lower levels of education.  
Finally, I test for acute injury-related job lock using the full specification of Model 2 and 
regression results are shown in Table 4 Columns B and C. The impact of ESHI remains negative 
and highly significant. Acute injuries in the family or to the individual have no significant impact 
on the likelihood of job change when controlling for other personal and job-related 
characteristics. Model 2 shows evidence of job lock generated by a family member’s acute injury 
but shows no evidence of personal acute injury-related job lock. The coefficient for the 
interaction between ESHI and individual acute injury is positive and insignificant. The 
interaction between ESHI and family acute injury has a negative coefficient that is significant at 
the 10% level. The effects of most control variables do not change when the tests for job lock are 
included. Older individuals, men, pensioned or union workers, and individuals with larger 
families remain significantly less likely to change jobs holding all else constant. However, all 
dummy variables for region become insignificant. Furthermore, hourly wage becomes 
insignificant although the coefficients retain the expected negative sign in both models of acute 
injury. 
Discussion 
The tests for acute injury-related job lock provide very weak evidence for reduced labor 
mobility from ESHI. Personal acute injury does not reduce mobility more for workers with ESHI 
relative to other groups when considering job mobility between two consecutive survey rounds 
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or with controls for previous job change in the survey. Acute injury in the family does not reduce 
mobility more for employees with ESHI between any two consecutive rounds. A family 
member’s acute injury enhances job lock for workers between Rounds 4 and 5 when controlling 
for previous job change in Rounds 1 through 3 among other personal and job characteristics. 
However, this evidence for job lock is not strong. The fact that hourly wage has an insignificant 
impact on the likelihood of job mobility between Rounds 4 and 5 suggests there may be omitted 
variable bias or measurement error in the data. Furthermore, as part of a sensitivity analysis for 
job lock, I control for time effects in Model 1 by regressing observations of job change 
separately between Round 1 and 2, Rounds 2 and 3, etc. The Model 2 regressions use a similar 
set of observations as the sensitivity analysis regressions for acute injury-related job lock 
between Rounds 4 and 5. The sensitivity analysis regression does not control for job change in 
previous rounds and acute injury is measured as visits to an emergency room occurring during 
Round 4. Like in Model 2, the test for family acute injury-related job lock in the sensitivity 
analysis regression shows significant proof of job lock and the coefficient for hourly wage 
becomes insignificant. No other regressions in the sensitivity analysis provide evidence of job 
lock. Because evidence of acute injury-related job lock is found solely between Rounds 4 and 5, 
there may also be an uncontrolled time-related factor generating family acute injury-related job 
lock. Rounds 4 and 5 of Panel 19 take place during the end of 2015 and it is possible an external 
event or trend occurred during this time period generating acute injury-related job lock.  
More generally, the results of the regression models in this study may be impacted by 
attenuation bias and multicollinearity. Using emergency room visits as a measure of acute injury 
does not capture all acute illness or injury experienced by the survey respondents. For example, 
some respondents that experienced acute illnesses could have sought care from their primary 
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care physicians or visited a local clinic rather than an emergency room. These unobserved 
instances of acute illnesses could bias the interaction variable coefficients toward zero. 
Furthermore, it is possible some individuals and family members who experience acute illness or 
injury choose not to go to the emergency room because they do not have health insurance. As 
such, the independent variables for acute injury measured as emergency room visits and ESHI 
could be correlated and result in larger standard errors for significance-testing the coefficients. 
However, this analysis also uses a large sample size which should lower coefficient standard 
errors for significance-testing. Finally, the models used in this study measure job lock only in the 
immediate months following an acute injury to best fit the survey structure used by the MEPS. 
The MEPS only tracks respondents for at most two years over five survey rounds yet the full 
effect of job lock generate by acute illness may only be observed over a longer time period than a 
few months after an acute illness.  
Conclusion 
 The results of this study find inconclusive evidence of job lock generated by the 
experience of an acute illness. The data suggests that a family member’s acute injury may 
generate job lock, but there may be an uncontrolled time effect toward the end of 2015 affecting 
this estimate of job lock. Furthermore, the findings may be impacted by measurement error due 
to the definition of acute illness as emergency room visits as well as collinearity between 
emergency room visits and health insurance. Additional research on acute injury-related job lock 
can expand the time period for observing acute illness and job change to test if job lock is 
generated over longer periods. Future studies might also test specific types of acute illness, such 
as flu incidence, to control for attenuation bias in measures of job lock.  
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Appendix 
 
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
Job Change 24941 0.078 0.268 0 1 
Recent Job Change 6277 0.139 0.346 0 1 
Personal Acute Injury 24941 0.032 0.177 0 1 
Family Member Acute Injury 24941 0.063 0.243 0 1 
Family Size (# of Members) 24941 3.174 1.657 1 13 
Region of U.S. 
     
Northeast 24941 0.142 0.349 0 1 
Midwest 24941 0.189 0.391 0 1 
South 24941 0.372 0.483 0 1 
West 24941 0.298 0.457 0 1 
Age  24941 40.506 13.598 16 84 
Male 24941 0.510 0.500 0 1 
Race 
     
Hispanic 24941 0.306 0.461 0 1 
White 24941 0.389 0.487 0 1 
Black 24941 0.194 0.396 0 1 
Asian 24941 0.082 0.275 0 1 
Multiple Races 24941 0.029 0.167 0 1 
General Health Status 
     
Excellent 24941 0.277 0.448 0 1 
Very Good 24941 0.353 0.478 0 1 
Good 24941 0.283 0.450 0 1 
Fair 24941 0.078 0.268 0 1 
Poor 24941 0.009 0.095 0 1 
Hourly Wage ($) 24941 19.587 13.870 0.28 80 
Union Member 24941 0.114 0.318 0 1 
White Collar 24941 0.746 0.435 0 1 
Pension 24941 0.474 0.499 0 1 
ESHI 24941 0.499 0.500 0 1 
Education 
     
Less than High School 24941 0.159 0.366 0 1 
High School 24941 0.573 0.495 0 1 
Bachelor's Degree 24941 0.171 0.376 0 1 
Graduate Degree 24941 0.097 0.296 0 1 
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Table 2: T-test Results 
Variable Sample 1 Sample 2 
ESHI 20.11 (<.0001) 10.47 (<.0001) 
Personal Acute Injury -4.33 (<.0001) -3.16 (0.0016) 
Family Member Acute Injury -1.01 (0.3136) -0.32 (0.7474) 
ESHI*Personal Acute Injury 0.02 (0.9867) 1.03 (0.3038) 
ESHI*Family Member Acute Injury 4.06 (<.0001) 5.26 (<.0001) 
 T-Statistic (p-value) 
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Table 3: Model 1 Results 
Variable A: Controls 
Only 
B: Personal Acute 
Injury 
C: Family Member 
Acute Injury 
Intercept -0.537*** 
(0.078) 
-0.515*** 
(0.079) 
-0.501*** 
(0.079) 
ESHI  -0.321*** 
(0.031) 
-0.319*** 
(0.031) 
Personal Acute Injury  0.199*** 
(0.072) 
 
Family Member Acute Injury   0.034 
(0.059) 
ESHI*Personal Acute Injury  0.101 
(0.127) 
 
ESHI*Family Acute Injury   0.021 
(0.104) 
Family Size -0.013* 
(0.007) 
-0.018** 
(0.007) 
-0.020*** 
(0.007) 
Midwest 0.133 *** 
(0.043) 
0.144*** 
(0.043) 
0.144*** 
(0.043) 
South 0.082**  
(0.039) 
0.105*** 
(0.039) 
0.103*** 
(0.039) 
West 0.065 
(0.041) 
0.086** 
(0.041) 
0.085** 
(0.041) 
Hispanic -0.169 *** 
(0.033) 
-0.167*** 
(0.033) 
-0.168*** 
(0.033) 
Black -0.044  
(0.034) 
-0.043 
(0.034) 
-0.041 
(0.034) 
Asian -0.142*** 
(0.051) 
-0.128** 
(0.051) 
-0.130** 
(0.051) 
Multiple Races 0.051* 
(0.067) 
0.069 
(0.067) 
0.070 
(0.067) 
Age -0.015*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.015*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.015*** 
(0.0009) 
Male -0.044* 
(0.026) 
-0.032 
(0.026) 
-0.034 
(0.026) 
Very Good  -0.008  
(0.030) 
-0.005 
(0.033) 
-0.002 
(0.030) 
Good -0.065** 
(0.032) 
-0.069** 
(0.033) 
-0.064* 
(0.033) 
Fair 0.083* 
(0.048) 
0.066 
(0.049) 
0.082* 
(0.048) 
Poor 0.306*** 
(0.111) 
0.301*** 
(0.112) 
0.328*** 
(0.112) 
Hourly Wage -0.006*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
Union Member -0.164*** 
(0.047) 
-0.121** 
(0.048) 
-0.118** 
(0.048) 
White Collar 0.055* 
(0.031) 
0.043 
(0.031) 
0.044 
(0.031) 
Pension -0.295*** 
(0.029) 
-0.151*** 
(0.032) 
-0.153*** 
(0.032) 
Less Than High School -0.033  
(0.049) 
-0.065 
(0.049) 
-0.064 
(0.049) 
High School -0.022  
(0.037) 
-0.034 
(0.038) 
-0.033 
(0.038) 
Graduate Degree 0.186*** 
(0.051) 
0.182*** 
(0.052) 
0.181*** 
(0.052) 
* p< 0.1; ** p< 0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 4: Model 2 Results 
Variable A: Controls 
Only 
B: Personal Acute 
Injury 
C: Family Member 
Acute Injury 
Intercept -0.635*** 
(0.168) 
-0.597*** 
(0.170) 
-0.587*** 
(0.169) 
ESHI  -0.356*** 
(0.069) 
-0.322*** 
(0.066) 
Personal Acute Injury  0.131 
(0.088) 
 
Family Member Acute Injury   0.062 
(0.113) 
ESHI*Personal Acute Injury  0.118 
(0.157) 
 
ESHI*Family Acute Injury   -0.381* 
(0.269) 
Recent Job Change 0.323*** 
(0.063) 
0.285*** 
(0.064) 
0.287*** 
(0.064) 
Family Size -0.037** 
(0.016) 
-0.043*** 
(0.016) 
-0.044*** 
(0.016) 
Midwest 0.031 
(0.089) 
0.047 
(0.089) 
0.048 
(0.089) 
South 0.082**  
(0.039) 
-0.007 
(0.080) 
-0.013 
(0.080) 
West 0.-0.094 
(0.085) 
-0.069 
(0.085) 
-0.070 
(0.085) 
Hispanic -0.084 
(0.069) 
-0.080 
(0.069) 
-0.080 
(0.069) 
Black -0.024 
(0.073) 
-0.035 
(0.073) 
-0.022 
(0.073) 
Asian -0.131 
(0.111) 
-0.120 
(0.112) 
-0.130 
(0.112) 
Multiple Races 0.148 
(0.135) 
0.151 
(0.137) 
0.158 
(0.136) 
Age -0.011*** 
(0.002) 
-0.010*** 
(0.002) 
-0.010*** 
(0.002) 
Male -0.154*** 
(0.055) 
-0.141** 
(0.055) 
-0.149*** 
(0.055) 
Very Good  -0.012 
(0.064) 
-0.006 
(0.065) 
-0.0005 
(0.065) 
Good -0.042 
(0.068) 
-0.056 
(0.069) 
-0.04 
(0.069) 
Fair -0.003 
(0.108) 
-0.038 
(0.110) 
-0.007 
(0.109) 
Poor 0.250 
(0.290) 
0.225 
(0.297) 
0.259 
(0.295) 
Hourly Wage -0.005** 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
Union Member -0.285** 
(0.110) 
-0.229** 
(0.112) 
-0.215* 
(0.112) 
White Collar 0.005 
(0.065) 
-0.007 
(0.066) 
-0.005 
(0.066) 
Pension -0.313*** 
(0.062) 
-0.166** 
(0.068) 
-0.175** 
(0.068) 
Less Than High School 0.060 
(0.103) 
0.012 
(0.104) 
0.017 
(0.104) 
High School -0.010 
(0.083) 
-0.028 
(0.084) 
-0.024 
(0.083) 
Graduate Degree 0.245** 
(0.113) 
0.227** 
(0.114) 
0.220* 
(0.114) 
* p< 0.1; ** p< 0.05; *** p<0.01 
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